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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
Priority No. 2 
v. : 
HEATHER ALENE BERLIN, : Case No. 970273-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of a controlled substance 
(methamphetamine), an enhanced first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 
58-37-8(l)(a)(iv) and 58-37-8(5)(a)(viii) (1996 & Supp. 1997). This Court has 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court properly determine that defendant failed to 
establish a prima facie case of entrapment? 
2. Did the trial court enter supportive factual findings? 
Defendant fails to ground her claims in the record or with case authority. 
They should be rejected on that ground. State v. Price, 827 P.2d 250 (Utah App. 1992); 
State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303 (1995): 
(1) It is a defense that the actor was entrapped into 
committing the offense. Entrapment occurs when a law 
enforcement officer or a person directed by or acting in 
cooperation with the officer induces the commission of an 
offense in order to obtain evidence of the commission for 
prosecution by methods creating a substantial risk that the 
offense would be committed by one not otherwise ready to 
commit it. Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity 
to commit an offense does not constitute entrapment. 
(4) Upon written motion of the defendant, the court shall hear 
evidence on the issue and shall determine as a matter of fact 
and law whether the defendant was entrapped to commit the 
offense... 
(5) Should the court determine that the defendant was 
entrapped, it shall dismiss the case with prejudice, but if the 
court determines the defendant was not entrapped, such issue 
may be presented by the defendant to the jury at trial... 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine with intent to 
distribute, an enhanced first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-
8(l)(a)(iv) and 58-37-8(5)(a)(viii) (1996 & Supp. 1997) (R. 3). 
Defendant filed a Notice of Entrapment Defense (R. 41-42), and a 
supporting memorandum (R. 51-64) (copies are contained in addendum A). An 
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evidentiary hearing was held on 7-8 November 1996 (R. 47,65). The trial court ruled 
that defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of entrapment, and on that ground, 
declined to dismiss the criminal charge (R. 563) (a complete copy of the trial court's oral 
ruling is contained in addendum B). Thereafter, defendant entered a conditional guilty 
plea, preserving her right to challenge the trial court's ruling (R. 69-76). 
The trial court imposed the statutory term, fines and fees (R. 90). The trial 
court then stayed the imposition of sentence and placed defendant on a 36-month term of 
probation (Id). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
This case arises out of a drug culture friendship which developed over the 
course of a few months between defendant, a drug dealer, and one of her customers, Terri 
Williams1 (R. 312-13, 334, 357,466). After a stint in jail, Williams became disillusioned 
with the lifestyle and approached the St. George Police Department to work as a 
confidential informant in November 1995 (164-71,182,193,232-35, 307-08,311). 
Williams was working as a confidential informant a few months later, on 20 January 
1996, when she participated in a controlled drug buy in the parking lot of Lin's 
Thriftway, in St. George, Utah. Defendant sold her two grams of methamphetamine for 
$200 (R. 326-328,457). 
1
 By the time of the entrapment hearing, Williams had married and went by 
the last name of Hoskey (R. 178). 
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When drug charges were filed against her, defendant claimed that she had 
been entrapped by Williams, who, as a result of their friendship was aware of defendant's 
emotional and financial vulnerabilities (R. 41-42), addendum A. An evidentiary hearing 
on defendant's entrapment claim was held on 7-8 November 1996 (R. 47,65). The trial 
credited defendant's assertions regarding the nature of her relationship with Williams (R. 
552).2 In addition to considering Williams' importance to defendant as a friend, the trial 
court took into account defendant's susceptibilities as an average drug dealer/user (R. 
553-54). Ultimately, however, the trial court deemed Williams' friendship with 
defendant an insufficient basis upon which to support defendant's claims of entrapment 
(R. 552-563). 
Specifically, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to defendant's 
claim (R. 552), the trial court found that Williams and defendant "shared conversations on 
intimate and personal subjects regarding difficulties in each of their lives on many 
occasions" (R. 559). For example, Williams was aware that defendant was separated 
from her husband, and raising their two children without any financial assistance from her 
husband (R. 556); that defendant received $700 in public assistance per month (R. 557); 
that defendant did not have a car (R. 558); that Williams and other friends provided rides 
for defendant and her children (id); that defendant was in the process of purchasing a car 
2
 The trial court's oral findings were not formalized into a written ruling. A 
complete copy of the trial court's oral ruling is contained in addendum B. 
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from another of her friends in the drug culture (id); that defendant had recently received 
an eviction notice (R. 560); and that Williams had offered to help defendant find new 
housing (R. 568). 
Williams was also aware that police had executed a search warrant for 
defendant's residence on 5 January 1996, seizing approximately six grams of 
methamphetamine, and approximately $600 cash; that defendant admitted some of the 
cash seized "constituted drug money" (R. 557); that defendant received financial 
assistance from her family to pay for legal counsel and to make bail (R. 558); Williams 
was aware defendant had appeared in district court on 17 January 1996, on yet another 
drug charge (Id.). 
Based on his observations of both defendant and Williams at the entrapment 
hearing, the trial court further found that defendant was the "more articulate" of the two; 
that she had "a better presence"; and was "more personally secure in her capabilities, her 
intellect, her talents and her self sufficiency and reliance" than was Williams (R. 559). 
Indeed, defendant is a Michigan State University graduate, and has "substantial 
experience in the economic world in earning money and running businesses" (R. 557-58). 
Concerning the instant drug transaction, the trial court found that Williams 
called defendant five different times on 20 January 1996. While the first phone call was 
not drug related, the last four phone calls were drug related (R. 560-61). Williams did not 
ask defendant to sell her methamphetamine based on any claim of "desperate illness," 
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"sympathy," "pity or close personal friendship". Rather, "if there was an appeal made, it 
was on the basis of [Williams] offering an economic inducement" in light of defendant's 
financial needs (R. 560-61). Williams also mentioned approaching defendant's sister (R. 
565). 
The trial court further found that defendant had previously told Williams 
that she was "no longer in the business", particularly in light of the 5 January 1996, 
seizure of drugs and cash from her home. However, Williams and defendant discussed 
doing $400 worth of business; specifically, Williams would purchase four grams of 
methamphetamine and defendant would realize a $200 profit. Ultimately, defendant 
agreed to sell defendant two grams of methamphetamine for $200 (R. 561).3 
Turning to the facts of the drug deal itself, the trial court found that 
Williams and defendant met in the parking lot of a local supermarket; that defendant 
removed two packages of methamphetamine from her bra; that defendant threw the 
packages into the back seat of her car; that Williams placed $200 in a grocery bag on the 
3
 Defendant testified that while she told Williams she was then "out of 
business", she "would see if there was something available" (R. 441). Initially, Williams 
and defendant discussed doing $400 worth of business, but Williams reduced the dollar 
amount once defendant indicated her willingness to do the deal: "She did change the 
dollar amount, and I told her that, you know, since I wasn't in business anyway and if I 
had to go find it, what did she want" (R. 442-43). 
The Fifth phone call, finalizing the details of the transaction, was taped and 
introduced in the proceedings below (R. 294-95, 308,444). The tape has not been 
included in the record on appeal. 
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floor of the back seat area; and that Williams then took the two baggies, eventually 
turning them over to St. George police (R. 562). 
Based on the above, the trial court ultimately concluded that defendant was 
not entrapped by Williams (R. 563). The "pivotal fact" for the trial court was that even 
"as the economic inducement" for a person of defendant's "vulnerability reduced" from a 
$200 to a $100 profit, she persisted in completing the drug deal (R. 569). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Under the facts presented at the entrapment hearing, the trial court properly 
determined that defendant was not entrapped. The State's confidential informant, Terri 
Williams, merely afforded defendant an opportunity to sell methamphetamine at its 
market value, and defendant took advantage of that opportunity. Defendant, who 
concedes that she was not entrapped by any conduct on the part of Williams, otherwise 
fails to support her claims of entrapment with cites to the record and/or case authority and 
they should therefore be rejected. 
As for defendant's claims that the trial court abdicated its fact-finding role, 
it is unsupported and also fails to demonstrate any error unfavorable to defendant. To the 
extent defendant is challenging the sufficiency of the supporting evidence, she has not 
marshaled the evidence. 
7 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT MAKES NO CLAIM OF ERROR 
REGARDING THE TRIAL COURT'S APPLICATION 
OF OBJECTIVE ENTRAPMENT TEST 
Point I of defendant's brief merely asserts that entrapment issues are 
determined under an objective test. Aplt. Br. 15-21. See State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496, 
503 (Utah 1979) (acknowledging that earlier adopted subjective test was "specifically 
rejected by the legislature"). Because defendant does not assert that the trial court mis-
applied the objective test set forth in Taylor, nor otherwise claim error in Point I, the State 
makes no response thereto. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS OF ENTRAPMENT ARE 
UNDERMINED BY HER CONCESSIONS ON APPEAL, 
ARE INADEQUATELY BRIEFED, AND/OR 
UNPRESERVED AND IGNORE CONTROLLING CASE 
AUTHORITY 
Defendant's Concession. In Point II of her brief, defendant concedes that 
the State's confidential informant, Terri Williams, did not entrap her into selling 
methamphetamine on 20 January 1996 
based upon claims of physical or psychological need or upon 
any other basis which would have arguably aroused feelings 
of sympathy or pity. She (Williams) did not declare that 
[defendant] should feel some sense of obligation based upon 
her personal relationship with Williams. She (Williams) did 
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not tell Appellant that she was going to be rich. 
Aplt. Br. at 25-26. 
Rather, defendant claims that she was entrapped based on the facts that she 
considered Williams a close personal friend, she needed the money, and she was afraid 
that Williams would do the drug deal with her sister. Aplt. Br. at 26-27. To the extent 
that defendant's concessions do not belie her claims of entrapment, her claims are 
inadequately briefed and/or unpreserved and ignore controlling authority. 
Inadequate Briefing. Rule 24(a) (9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
requires that the argument portion of an appellant's brief "shall contain the contentions 
and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds 
for reviewing any issues not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, 
statutes, and parts of the record relied." Under this rule, Utah appellate courts decline to 
consider arguments that are not adequately supported by authority and analysis.4 
This Court should decline to consider Point II of defendant's brief because 
she has failed to comply with rule 24(a)(9). Defendant cites no supporting authority; nor 
4
 See, e.g., State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960,966 (Utah 1989); State v. 
Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341,1344 (Utah 1984); State v. Farrow, 919 P.2d 50, 53 n.l (Utah 
App. 1996); State v. Streeter, 900 P.2d 1097, 1100 n.3 (Utah App. 1995), cert, denied, 
913 P.2d 749 (Utah 1996); State v. Jennings, 875 P.2d 566, 569 n.3 (Utah App. 1994); 
State v. Mincy, 838 P.2d 648,652 n.2 (Utah App, 1992); State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 
248-50 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Day, 815 P.2d 1345,1351 (Utah App. 1991); State v. 
Coyer, 814 P.2d 604,613 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Sterger, 808 P.2d 122,125 n.2 (Utah 
App. 1991); State v. Pascoe, 114 P.2d 512, 514 n.l (Utah App. 1989). 
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has she grounded her claims with citations to the record. See Aplt. Br. at 26-27. Under 
the authorities cited in n.4, supra, this Court should therefore decline to reach defendant's 
claims that she was entrapped by her friendship with Williams, her need for money, and 
her concern that Williams would do the deal with her sister. 
Waiver. An additional ground for not reaching defendant's claim regarding her 
concern that Williams would involve her sister is that this issue was not preserved below. 
In her statement of relevant facts, defendant cites the record (R. 433-335,437,439-440, 
540, 561) for the propositions that her sister was "very vulnerable" and that she was 
"apparently disturbed by the thought of her sister being compromised on any level." Aplt. 
Br. at 10. Defendant further asserts that her concern for her sister was "apparently what it 
took to motivate [her]" to participate in the drug deal. Id. Finally, defendant asserts that 
she was upset, upon finding out that Williams had been talking to her sister on the phone 
on the day of the drug deal, citing (R. 446). Aplt. Br. at 11-12. 
The above record cites do not support these propositions. The most that can 
be said is that defendant testified she "was concerned why [defendant] would want to 
even involve [her] sister" in the drug deal (R. 434-335); and that she did not want her 
sister involved (R. 439). Moreover, the record does not preclude an inference that 
defendant's reluctance to have her sister involved in the deal could just have easily been 
her desire to keep the profit from William's drug business to herself (R. 434-335,439). 
Ultimately, defendant did not rely upon any argument relating to her sister 
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in explaining her theory of entrapment to the trial court. Rather, defendant's entrapment 
claim was premised exclusively on the nature of her friendship with Williams (R. 541-
544). Other than finding that Williams had contacted defendant's sister, the trial court, 
accordingly, did not address this issue. Defendant argues no exception to the preservation 
requirement on appeal. The argument is therefore not subject to review under any 
standard. State v. Johnson, 11A P.2d 1141,1144-45 (Utah 1989) (requiring "some form 
of specific preservation of claims of error [below] before an appellate court will review 
such claim on appeal11), habeas corpus dismissed, 1997 Utah LEXIS 86 (Utah 1997); 
State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) (where appellant does not argue 
that "exceptional circumstances or "plain error" justifies review of an unpreserved issue, 
the reviewing court will decline to consider it on appeal). 
Meritless Claims. Defendant's claims regarding her financial need and 
friendship with Williams were arguably preserved below (R. 541-544). Even assuming, 
however, these claims can survive defendant's appellate concessions and inadequate 
briefing, they lack merit. First, defendant does not contest the trial court's finding that as 
her potential profit decreased from $200 to $100, she persisted in arranging and 
completing the drug transaction with Williams (R. 561-562), addendum A. This finding 
is well supported by defendant's own testimony (R. 442-443). More importantly, 
defendant's allegation of personal financial need fails to suggest that she was entrapped 
by Williams' conduct. The pertinent question for entrapment law purposes, is not how 
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badly defendant needed the money, but whether Williams persuaded or induced defendant 
to commit the drug offense by means which would be effective to persuade an average 
person, "other than one who was merely given the opportunity to commit the offense." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303(1) (1995); State v. Beddoes, 890 P.2d 1,2 (Utah App. 1995) 
("The objective standard focuses solely on the actions of the government, and not on the 
defendant's predisposition, to determine whether entrapment has occurred."), cert 
denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995). Williams' offer to purchase two grams of 
methamphetamine for the "retail" price of $200, netting defendant a $100 profit, is not an 
inducement that would persuade an average person, other than one who was merely given 
the opportunity to commit the offense. 
Second, friendship is by itself an insufficient basis upon which to establish 
entrapment. Beddoes, 890 P.2d at 3 ("Utah courts have held, however, that friendship 
alone does not constitute entrapment"). See also State v. Keitz, 856 P.2d 685, 688-89 
(Utah App. 1993); State v. Martinez, 848 P.2d 702, 707 (Utah App. 1993); State v. 
Moore, 782 P.2d 497, 500 (Utah 1989). To establish entrapment on the basis of 
friendship, defendant must demonstrate that Williams exploited the relationship in an 
appeal to her sympathy or pity. Beddoes, 890 P.2d at 3 (citing Taylor, 599 P.2d at 498-
99, 503-04). As noted previously, defendant expressly disavows that Williams exploited 
their friendship for the purpose of entrapping her into selling methamphetamine. Aplt. 
Br. at 25-26. 
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POINT III 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS THAT THE TRIAL COURT 
ABDICATED ITS FACT-FINDING ROLE AND 
INCORRECTLY VIEWED THE EVIDENCE BELOW 
ARE UNSUPPORTED IN THE RECORD 
In Point III of her brief defendant broadly asserts that she was "denfied]... 
the opportunity of having a law-trained trier of fact make an independent determination of 
the entrapment issue." Aplt. Br. at 31. Defendant suggests that the trial court failed to 
recognize the scope of its role in the entrapment proceeding; specifically, that the court 
abdicated its fact-finding role. Aplt. Br. at 31-32. Defendant fails to ground her claim in 
the record and it should be rejected on that ground. Price, 827 P.2d at 250; Amicone, 689 
P.2d at 1344. Moreover, her claim is not supportable in the record: the trial court clearly 
entered detailed factual findings (R. 552-563, 565, 568), see addendum B. 
Alternatively, defendant asserts that even if the trial court "made its own 
findings . . . it viewed the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the 
light most favorable to [defendant]." Aplt. Br. at 32. Defendant suggests that this 
"clearly indicates that the court did not undertake to decide the case as the trier of fact." 
Id. Defendant fails to ground this argument in case authority. Price, 827 P.2d at 250; 
Amicone, 689 P.2d at 1344. Nor does she explain how the alleged error, viewing the 
evidence below in the light most favorable to her entrapment claim, was unfavorable. 
See, e.g., Shurtieffv. Jay Tuft & Co., 622 P.2d 1168,1172 (Utah 1980) (holding no 
13 
ground for reversal where any prejudice caused by erroneous jury instruction was 
favorable to the defendant). 
Further, defendant asserts that she was entitled to a favorable entrapment 
ruling, "if any reasonable trier of fact could have concluded that she had been entrapped." 
Aplt. Br. at 32. Defendant similarly fails to ground this claim in case authority. Price, 
827 P.2d at 250; Amicone, 689 P.2d at 1344. Moreover, as set forth in Point I, her 
entrapment claims are unsupported by record or by case authority. 
In any event, contrary to defendant's assertion, the trial court in an 
entrapment hearing performs a gatekeeping function. A pretrial motion to dismiss on the 
grounds of entrapment is similar to a motion to dismiss at the close of the evidence at 
trial: in the face of "lack of certainty as to the conclusion to be drawn from the conflicting 
evidence" the trial court should "refuse[] to rule as a matter of law that the defendant was* 
entrapped and submit[] that issue to the jury." State v. Hansen, 588 P.2d 164, 166 (Utah 
1978). 
Finally, to the extent defendant's claim can be read as a challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence in the support of the trial court's ruling that she was not 
entrapped, defendant wholly fails to marshal the supporting evidence. State v. Drobel, 
815 P.2d 724,734 (Utah App. 1991) ("An appellant raising issues of fact on appeal must, 
under Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a), marshal all the evidence supporting the trial court's findings, 
and then show that evidence to be insufficient."), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 
14 
1991). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above, the Court should uphold the trial court's finding that 
defendant was not entrapped and should also affirm her conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on^fo January 1998. 
MARIAN DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
(AN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that on^CL January 1998,1 caused to be mailed, by U.S. Mail, 
postage prepaid, two accurate copies of this BRIEF OF APPELLEE, to: 
MICHAEL D. ESPLIN 
Aldrich, Nelson, Weight, & Esplin 
43 East 200 North 
P.O. Box "L" 
Provo, Utah 84603-0200 
Attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDA 
Addendum A 
GARY W. PENDIJETON (2564) 
Attorney for Defendant 
150 North 200 East, Suite 202 
St George, Utah 84770 
Ph: 628-4411 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
HEATHER BERLIN, 
Plaintiff, ] 
Defendant ] 
NOTICEOFENTRAPMENTDEFENSE 
> AND MOTION FOR EVIDENTIARY 
HEARING 
} Case No. 961500846 FS 
1 Judge James L. Shumate 
Defendant contends that the state's now-disclosed informant unfairly and 
improperly used her personal relationship with defendant, her knowledge of defendant's dire 
financial circumstances, and the impending eviction of the defendant and her children in an 
attempt to induce the defendant to acquire and deliver methamphetamine. Defendant 
hereby gives notice that she intends to assert entrapment as an "affirmative" defense. This 
notice is not to be construed as an admission of any criminal misconduct on the part of the 
defendant See. Utah Code Ann. §76-2-303(3). 
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Defendant hereby moves the court to conduct an evidentiary hearing and 
determine that, as a matter of fact and law, the defendant was entrapped. 
DATED this / day of Octoh*r,1996. 
Gary W. Pfcndletonj 
Attorney forDeferidant 
DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that on the 1 day of October, 1996,1 did personally 
deliver a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing notice and motion to Wade A. 
Farraway, Deputy Washington County Attorney at 178 North 200 East, St. George, Utah 
84770. 
Secretary 
GARY W. PENDLETON (2564) 
Attorney for Defendant 
150 North 200 East, Suite 202 
St George, Utah 84770 
Ph: 628-4411 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HEATHER BERLIN, 
Defendant 
DEFENDANTS MEMORANDUM OF 
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES ON 
HEARING RE: ENTRAPMENT (AND 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS Ml^ffiJE) 
Case No. 961500846 
Judge James L. Shumate 
Defendant presents the following statement of points and authorities for the 
court's review and consideration in connection with the evidentiary hearing which is to be 
conducted in the above-entitled matter pursuant to defendant's notice of her intention to 
raise the defense of entrapment Should the state's case survive the court's ruling on said 
hearing, evidentiary issues will need to be addressed at the threshold of any proceeding 
conducted before a jury and accordingly this memorandum is filed in support of motions jn. 
Hmjne which are filed herewith or may be filed hereafter. 
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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
POINT I 
UNDER UTAH LAW, THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR 
NOT A DEFENDANT HAS BEEN ENTRAPPED IS 
DETERMINED BY AN OBJECTIVE REVIEW OF THE 
POLICE TACTICS EMPLOYED, NOT A DEFENDANTS 
PREDISPOSITION TO COMMIT CRIME. 
Generally speaking, there are two rules or tests which are commonly applied 
in the various jurisdictions of the United States in determining whether or not a defendant 
has been unfairly entrapped in the commission of an offense. These are the subjective test 
and the objective test 
Under the subjective test, there are two inquiries: (1) Was there an 
inducement on the part of the government? and (2) If so, did the defendant show any 
predisposition to commit the offense? §eg 62 A.LR.3d 110, Anno.: Modern Status of Law 
Concerning Entrapment to Commit Narcotics Offense - State cases, §2(a), p. 114. 
Under the objective test, the focus is not on the propensities and 
predisposition of the specific defendant, but on whether the police tactics employed fall 
below commonly accepted notions concerning the proper use of governmental authority. 
See State v. Tavlor. 599 P.2d 496, 500 (Utah 1979). 
This concept establishes entrapment on its historical basis; the 
refusal to countenance a perversion of justice by government 
misconduct The objective view provides a solid definitive 
standard upon which the defense can rest, Le., does the conduct 
of the government comport with a fair and honorable 
administration of justice? 
cz 
Under the objective view, the defense does not deprive the 
police of the use of decoys to afford a person an opportunity to 
commit crime; however it does deny the use of decoys to 
present actively, inducements for the purpose of luring a person 
into the commission of an offense. The government is not 
permitted to engage in the manufacture of crime. The prime 
duty of the government's law enforcement agencies is the 
prevention of crime through the apprehension of those anti-
social persons who, without inducement, are engaged in the 
commission of crime. 
Id. 
Not so long ago, the concept of the government inducing the commission of 
a public offense was almost unthinkable. In State v. McComkh. 59 Utah 58, 201 P. 637 
(1921), the Utah Supreme Court articulated an objective test by which the issue of 
entrapment was to be determined. 
Policeman are conservators of the peace. It is their duty to 
prevent crime, not to instigate and encourage its commission. 
Nothing can be more reprehensible than to induce the 
commission of crime for the purpose of apprehending and 
convicting the perpetrator. To advise or encourage a criminal 
act is itself a crime. Comp. Laws Utah, §7919. In his zeal and 
anxiety to apprehend some one in a criminal act, this city 
detective deliberately planned and induced the commission of 
an offense which otherwise would not have been committed by 
anyone. 
By these strictures we do not intend to criticize the good 
services rendered by faithful policemen, generally, but, in the 
language of the Supreme Court of Colorado in Connor v. 
People. 18 Colo. 373, 33 Pac 159, 25 USJL 341, 36 Am. St 
Rep. 295: 
We do say that when in their zeal, or under a 
mistaken sense of duty, detectives suggest the 
commission in order to arrest them while in the 
3 
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act, although the purpose may be to capture old 
offenders, their conduct is not only reprehensible, 
but criminal, and ought to be rebuked rather than 
encouraged by the courts. 
I& at 65-66 (emphasis added). See also, Salt Lake Citv v. Robinson. 40 Utah 448,125 P. 
654 (1912) (objective view of entrapment adopted). Note: Connor is misquoted in Tavlor. 
599 P.2d at 501. 
However, apparently concerned that someone who was predisposed and 
indeed ready to commit an offense may escape punishment if cases were decided by 
reference to the propriety or impropriety of police tactics alone, the Utah Supreme Court 
articulated the law of entrapment to include the examination of lfthe defendant's attitude of 
mind.M See State v. Pacheco. 13 Utah 2d 148,151, 369 P.2d 494, 496 (1962). In so doing 
the court in substance and effect concluded that "a line must be drawn between the trap for 
the unweaiy innocent and the trap for the unweaiy criminal.11 See Taylor. 599 P.2d at 501. 
Eleven years later, the Legislature enacted §76-2-303(1) as a part of the 
comprehensive revision of the Utah Criminal Code. See Laws of Utah 1973, ch. 196, §76-2-
303. This section has not been revised since its enactment It follows the format and theory 
(objective) set forth in §2.13(1) of the Model Penal Code, Proposed Official Draft (1962). 
The Utah statute, in relevant part, reads: 
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer or a person 
directed by or acting in cooperation with the officer induces the 
commission of an offense in order to obtain evidence of the 
commission for prosecution by methods creating a substantial 
risk that the offense would he committed by one not otherwise 
ready to commit it. 
4 
Emphasis added. The statute further states that the government does not entrap an 
individual by merely affording hfai "an opportunity to commit an offense.*1 The concept of 
"inducement" is discussed below. 
In Tentative Draft No. 9, this section of the model code included the objective 
test as one of two alternative proposals. Interestingly, the subjective test enjoyed "top 
billing." Finally, the American Law Institute endorsed the objective test when the Proposed 
Official Draft was adopted. 
While there is little room for serious argument concerning the appropriate 
interpretation of the language adopted by the Legislature and codified as §76-2-303, the 
Utah Supreme Court "stubbornly adhered to the subjective test, predisposition of the 
defendant,11 for six years after the criminal code was recodified. See Taylor. 599 P.2d at 501. 
Cf. State v. Hansen. 588 P.2d 164 (1978). It was not until the court handed down its 
decision in Taylor that the court examined the language of the statute in the context of the 
Model Penal Code provision after which it was patterned and abandoned its efforts to 
interpret the entrapment statute by "engraftpng] the case law setting forth the subjective 
standard onto a new statute, which by its express terms incorporates the objective standard." 
599 P.2d at 499. 
In so doing, a majority of the court fully embraced the philosophy that the 
defense of entrapment is appropriately invoked to deny a government, which fails to conduct 
itself with the dignity of government, the benefit of a conviction which arises out of its own 
misconduct and to do so whether or not the government can demonstrate the defendant's 
5 
"predisposition" to commit crime. 
Permissible police activity does not vary according to the 
particular defendant concerned; surety if two suspects had been 
solicited at the same time in the same manner, one should not 
go to jail simply because he has been convicted before and is 
said to have a criminal disposition. No more does it vary 
according to the suspicions, reasonable or unreasonable, of the 
police concerning the defendant's activities. Appeals to 
sympathy, friendship, the possibility of exuberant gain, and so 
forth, can no more be tolerated when directed against a past 
offender than against the ordinary law abiding citizen Past 
crimes do not forever outlaw the criminal and open him to 
police practices, aimed at securing his repeated conviction, from 
which the ordinary citizen is protected. The whole ameliorative 
hopes of modern penology and prison administration strongly 
counsel against such a view. 
Id. at 502 (quoting Sherman v. United States. 356 U.S. 369, 382-383 (1958)). 
The objective test provides "a solid definitive standard" against which the 
conduct of the police and their criminal operatives may be judged regardless of who they 
decide to target Moreover, the application of such a standard renders a defendant's 
"predisposition" to commit crime completely irrelevant in evaluating the conduct of the 
police. Because the defendant's character is not an issue on any level, the evidentiary and 
due process issues, which arose in the context of attempting to prove the defendant's 
predisposition to commit crime, have been eliminated. Cf. State v. Hansen. 588 P.2d at 168-
69 (EUett, C J., and Hall, J., dissenting). Simply stated, no matter who the government is 
dealing with, it must govern, not induce or lure the imweary "innocent" or the unweary 
"guilty" into the commission of public offenses. 
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POINT n 
METHODS WHICH HCREAT[E] A SUBSTANTIAL RISK" 
OF INDUCING THE ORDINARY CITIZEN ARE 
IMPROPER AND ILLEGAL. 
While the government has a legitimate interest in identifying and punishing 
those who are violating the law, it by no means has a legitimate interest in identifying and 
punishing those who can, by artifice or trickery, be seduced into a violation of the law. Any 
plan or scheme, which successfully identifies the former and at the same time creates a 
"substantial risk" of including the latter, is invalid and illegal. The objective test of 
entrapment rejects the notion that these two types of "offenders" can be sorted out after the 
fact. 
"Substantial risk" of inducement The issue is not whether or not the question/bolice tactics 
would induce the "average" or "ordinary" law-abiding citizen to commit an offense. The 
question is whether or not the tactics created a "substantial risk" that an offense would be 
committed by one not otherwise ready to engage in criminal activity, Le., whether or not the 
act was that of the defendant's free will or induced by another. State v. Cripps. 692 P.2d 747 
(Utah 1984). 
Realistically, an average person or ordinary citizen is not a 
former drug addict, will not be begged by a former lover to 
obtain drugs, does not have any notion of how to reach people 
who sell drugs, would probably not befriend the sort of stranger 
who turns out to be an undercover narcotics agent, and could 
not imagine circumstances short of physical threats that would 
prompt him to obtain marijuana to sell Unquestionably, the 
circumstances of each defendant should be considered in 
relation to the police conduct 
Id. at 749-50. 
Character of solicitation. Beginning with Tavlor. 599 P.2d at 503, and consistently 
thereafter, the Utah appellate courts have held that appeals based upon sympathy, pity, 
close personal relationships, and greed are suspect These are appeals which create a 
substantial risk of inducing a response from one not otherwise ready to commit an offense. 
Tavlor presented an outrageous scenario involving entrapment using a police 
informant who had a close personal, indeed a sexual, relationship with the defendant and 
who appealed to the defendant for assistance in acquiring heroine because she was suffering 
the pangs of withdrawal The defendant had recently suffered withdrawal from the drug 
himself. There was no evidence of repeated solicitations. Apparently, the defendant had 
immediately responded to his former lover's request 
The reported cases which followed Taylor were set against quite a different 
factual background. In State v. Kourbelas. 621 P.2d 1238 (Utah 1980), the supreme court 
found the following factors to establish entrapment as a matter of fact and law: (1) the 
undercover agent was the party who brought up the subject of controlled substances; (2) the 
undercover agent was the one who renewed contact with the defendant, contacting him on 
at least five occasions for the purpose of soliciting the purchase of marijuana; and (3) while 
there were no appeals to friendship, loyalty, pity, or sympathy, the undercover agent had 
indicated that "a lot of money" could be made if he could get some marijuana for 
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distribution in the Lake Powell area. What the case lacked in terms suspect solicitations, 
it apparently made up for in terms of the number of solicitations initiated by the undercover 
agent before the defendant took the bait 
Repetition of solicitation. Although the Utah reported cases have repeatedly recited a 
litany of examples of solicitations which are considered to be outrageous or overreaching in 
their subject matter or context, these cases do not discuss the psychological effect that 
repeated solicitations can have upon someone who really has no desire to engage in criminal 
conduct Depending on the personalities involved, wearing someone down through repeated 
solicitations or invitations may indeed be a more effective methodology than is an outrageous 
solicitation which appeals to loyalty, lust, or greed. 
We have received little guidance concerning when a solicitation, not 
outrageous in its content or context, constitutes entrapment because it is outrageous in the 
frequency of its repetition. In State v. Sprague. 680 P.2d 404 (Utah 1984), the undercover 
agent solicited the defendant three times. The defendant did not appear to be troubled or 
insulted by any of these solicitations. On the first occasion the defendant suggested that the 
undercover agent's fvbest bet" would be to go to Provo. He gave the agent his name and 
telephone number stating that the officer could call him later. During the second 
solicitation, the defendant stated that he was going to Gunnison that night and might be able 
to get some marijuana at that time; he never made the trip. The defendant provided the 
marijuana during the third solicitation, but had to leave the cafe and obtain the substance 
9 
S9 
from someone else who returned to the cafe with the defendant and apparently made any 
profit which may have been realized in the transaction. 
The defendant was apparently motivated by a desire to become the undercover 
agent's friend. Obviously the desire to develop a friendship with an undercover agent or 
confidential informant is quite a different thing than is the use of an existing relationship to 
demand allegiance or loyalty. Again, what the entrapment defense lacked by way of 
outrageous solicitations, it made up by way of repeated solicitations. The court concluded 
that "the offense was induced by the persistant requests of [the undercover agent] not by the 
initiative and desire of defendant" Id. at 406. A dimension of the Sprague decision which 
is not apparent from reading the opinion itself is found in State v. Martin. 713 P.2d 60, 62 
(Utah 1986), where the supreme court indicated that the facts and circumstances of Sprague 
demonstrated the presence of "extreme vulnerability.11 See also Cripps. 692 P.2d at 749-50 
(police agent promised unemployed defendant he could find defendant a job). 
In State v. Udell 728 P.2d 131 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court handed 
down a decision which, at first blush, appeared to sound a retreat to the subjective test for 
entrapment. In that case neither the subject matter nor the context of the solicitations was 
such as would be considered likely to induce the commission of a public offense, however, 
police agents had solicited the defendant four times before he provided any substance. 
At the time of the first of these solicitations, the defendant did not have airy 
cocaine to sell, but told the undercover agent where the agent could purchase some. Before 
the officer left the defendant's apartment he had purchased cocaine, apparently from 
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someone living there with the defendant, and shared some of it with the defendant Upon 
the next solicitation, the defendant again indicated that he did not have any cocaine to sell 
and again directed the officer to a specific source for the purchase of the substance. When 
he was solicited the third time, the defendant agreed to have the officer return the following 
day. The next day, the fourth solicitation, a transaction was consummated 
The supreme court refused to interfere with a jury verdict finding that the 
defendant had not been entrapped. The court noted that the defendant had demonstrated 
by his conduct that he used cocaine, that he was aware of local drug marketing activities, and 
that he welcomed future contacts on the subject of drug trafficking. "All of these factors 
indicate that the police conduct was within reasonable bounds under the circumstances." Id. 
at 133. 
While Udell may initially appear to signal a return to the subjective test of 
entrapment, it must be bom in mind that none of the police solicitations, in their content 
or context, approached any of the suspect categories which the Utah appellate courts have 
repeatedly identified. In UdelL the alleged entrapment was based soley upon the number 
of solicitations. Each solicitation drew a response which certainty did not discourage further 
inquiiy. 
Sprague and Cripps stand for the proposition that special circumstances in the 
life of an ordinary law-abiding citizen may render that person unsualty vulnerable to certain 
types of appeals or persistant solicitations. Such circumstances are properly considered in 
determining whether or not police tactics created a "substantial risk.19 
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WHERE THERE IS EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD 
SUPPORTING A FINDING OF ENTRAPMENT, THE 
STATE BEARS THE BURDEN OF PROVING THAT THE 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTRAPPED AND MUST 
PROVE IT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. 
At this pretrial evidentiary entrapment hearing, as in a trial by jury, if evidence 
is presented which indicates that police agents solicited the commission of the offense and 
that such solicitations (1) were made by someone in a close personal relationship with the 
defendant, or (2) were of such a character or were made in such a context as would appeal 
to one not otherwise ready to commit an offense, or (3) were made repeatedly, the state 
must assume the burden of proving that the defendant was not entrapped and must prove 
it beyond a reasonable doubt 
It is sometimes said that when it is shown that the accused 
actually committed the offense (as here), the claim of 
entrapment is an affirmative defense which must be proved by 
the evidence somewhat analogous to the plea of confession and 
avoidance. But it is also to be kept in mind that the burden of 
proving the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is 
always upon the state: both initially and ultimately. Therefore, 
the only requirement on the defense of entrapment is that it be 
sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt that the defendant freely 
and voluntarily committed the crime. 
Accordingly, when the problem of entrapment is present, the 
inquiry focuses upon two propositions: (1) Does it appear 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime was the product of 
the defendant's voluntary will and desire to commit it; or (2), 
Was the crime induced or motivated by the actions of the 
prosecution. If the evidence relating to the second proposition 
raises a reasonable doubt as to the first, then there can be no 
12 
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conviction of the crime. 
State v. Curtis, 542 P.2d 744, 746-47 (Utah 1975)(footnotes omitted). Sge ajso Tavlor. 599 
P.2d at 504-05 (foregoing language used as jury instruction). 
As the Utah Supreme Court noted in reversing the conviction in Kourbelas: 
[I]f the rule as to the presumption of innocence is fairly and 
properly applied, there necessarily exists a reasonable doubt as 
to whether the offense committed was the product of the 
defendant's initiative desire or was induced by the persistent 
requests of [the police agent]. Accordingly, it is our conclusion 
that the defendant's conviction should be reversed. 
621 P.2d at 1240. 
At this stage of the proceedings, the court is the trier of fact See §76-2-303 
(4). The court does not determine whether or not the state has presented sufficient 
evidence from which a jury of reasonable persons may conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that the defendant was not entrapped The court must determine at this proceeding whether 
or not it finds, as a matter of "fact and law" and beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 
defendant was not entrapped. If the court finds and concludes beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant was not entrapped, the defendant is allowed to present the issue to the 
jury for its determination. See §76-2-303(5). !£ on the other hand, the court, as the trier 
13 
of fact, concludes that the defendant was entrapped or that there is a reasonable doubt as 
to whether or not she was entrapped, the prosecution is terminated at this point 
/emt 
i 
DATED this / _ day 
Gaiy Wl Pendleton / 
AttomeyfeiJQfiWdant 
DELIVERY CERTIFICATE i I do hereby certify that on the (_ day of November, 1996,1 did personally 
deliver a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Appearance to Wade A. 
Farraway, Deputy Washington County Attorney, a^ 178 North 200 East, St. George, Utah 
84770. 
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1 the Court. 
2 THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. Counsel, 
3 you have each given me substantial food for 
4 thought. I am going to take a recess. I'll come 
5 back on the bench at 4:30 with my findings and 
6 decision after I review the law and the facts. So 
7 keep yourselves available. I'll come back at 4:30. 
8 (Recess.) 
9 THE COURT: We are back in session in 
10 State versus Heather Berlin. The defendant is 
11 present, together with her counsel. State is 
12 represented by Mr. Farraway. 
13 As I have indicated before, the Court, at 
14 this stage in the proceedings, must draw every 
15 reasonable inference from the testimony amd evidence 
16 offered by the defense in favor of the proposition 
17 offered by the defense. 
18 I have gleaned my memory of the testimony 
19 of the last two days, have reviewed my own notes and 
20 have applied that standard in drawing every 
21 reasonable inference especially as to critical facts 
22 from this matter basically taking as conclusively 
23 proven the defendant's version of her relationship 
24 with the confidential informant Ms. Williams/ 
25 Hoskey. 
VAN FLEET COURT REPORTING,INC. (801) 652-9971 
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Based upon that analysis, and this is not 
a full analysis, after the State having rested, I 
then applied the factors most recently outlined by 
Judge Bench in the State versus Beddoes case which 
quote from Taylor and Richardson the following 
language, and it bears well to put it on the record 
here talking about the objective standard and the 
analysis that a court must use in an entrapment 
defense. 
I quote at page 3 of 890 Pacific 2.d 
bottom of the left-hand column, Under the objective 
standard the pivotal questions are, number one, does 
the conduct of the government comport with fair and 
honorable administration of justice, and, two, did 
the governmental conduct conduct a -- make that, did 
the governmental conduct create a substantial risk 
that an average person would be induced to commit 
the crime the defendant committed. 
Then it goes on, but let me stop here and 
use again another analysis which I must from the 
language in State versus Cripps. We are not talking 
about an average person. The reality shown in 
Cripps and the reality of the drug situation that we 
are dealing with here says that the Court must not 
look at an average person, but, frankly, must look 
VAN FLEET COURT REPORTING,INC. (801) 652-9971 
P.O. Box 2702, St. George, Utah 84771-2702 
55b 
177 
961500846 VOL- II 11-8-96 
at an average drug dealer, an average drug user at 
least, a person who understands and deals with the 
drug culture, a person who understands where drugs 
might become available, a person who understands 
what drugs might cost, a person who understands the 
security measures taken by those in the drug 
business to avoid things like surveillance and the 
hazards faced by ones engaged in that activity. 
So where the court of appeals has used 
this average person language, it's really --
(inaudible.) One must look at it from the average 
drug user, average drug dealer, whichever the 
appropriate case may be, and I must intertwine 
Cripps language --or State versus Cripps language 
in there. 
Then it goes on in the Beddoes case. 
Examples of what might constitute improper police 
conduct are extreme pleas of desperate illness or 
appeals based primarily on sympathy, pity, or close 
personal friendship or offers of inordinate sums of 
money. That is basically from Taylor. 
It goes on to state, Taylor suggests 
certain factors to consider when evaluating the 
conduct between the government representative and a 
defendant, the transactions leading up to the 
VAN FLEET COURT REPORTING,INC. (801) 652-9971 
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1 offense. The interaction between the agent and the 
2 defendant, and the response to the inducements of 
3 the agent are all to be considered in judging what 
4 the effect of the governmental agent's conduct would 
5 be on a normal person. 
6 Now, the Court, in view of that language 
7 from Taylor, has allowed this defendant and the 
8 presentation of the defendant's case in chief on 
9 this motion to suppress substantially broader 
10 latitude than the State thought that the Court 
11 should have. However, I believe that the message 
12 from Taylor is clear and that I must examine all of 
13 these facts and circumstances. 
14 Of all of the authorities submitted by 
15 counsel for both parties to the Court which do focus 
16 upon the objective standard, no one has submitted to 
17 me anything pre-Taylor for good cause since Taylor 
18 is the watershed case in this area. 
19 There is one fact circumstance that 
20 appears to be a case of first impression to the 
21 State of Utah and that is a circumstance where the 
22 defendant, as is claimed here, and which the Court 
23 must examine and make factual findings regarding, 
24 where the defendant is particularly, perhaps 
25 uniquely vulnerable to inducements by the State, and 
VAN FLEET COURT REPORTING,INC. (801) 652-9971 
P.O. Box 2702, St. George, Utah 84771-2702 
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I use the word inducements because the supreme court 
used it in Taylor. 
There is nothing inappropriate about 
inducements. It is the level of inducement. It is 
the level of activity smd whether or not that indeed 
offends fair and honorable administration of 
justice. 
Entrapment cases just like search and 
seizure cases are extremely fact sensitive and while 
my boiling down of these facts into my following 
findings might make everyone ask, why did we spend 
two days taking the evidence to get here, I don't 
know of any other way, and I compliment both counsel 
for their thoroughness in getting here. It may have 
been tedious but without it the Court could not 
reach these findings. 
I focus upon this defendant's 
circumstance, and as Taylor has indicated, the 
interaction between this defendant and Ms. 
Williams/Hoskey, the transactions leading up to the 
offense, and this defendant's response to the 
inducements of Ms. Hoskey. 
The Court finds as follows: On the 20th 
of January, 1996, this defendant was 43 years old. 
She was separated from her husband receiving no 
VAN FLEET COURT REPORTING,INC. (801) 652-9971 
P.O. Box 2702, St. George, Utah 84771-2702 
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support from him and raising two children based upon 
her own means. 
She was receiving as public assistance 
approximately $700 per month, which was deposited 
directly into a bank account. She could access that 
bank account by check. She has testified that she 
had no check blanks. 
She could access that bank account by 
horizon card, which, as I understand from the 
defendant's testimony, is basically a debit card 
against that bank account, and she could access that 
account by ATM, automatic teller machine, 
dispensing, as we all know, $20 bills in 
denominations. 
On the 20th of January of 1996, this 
defendant had been previously 15 days earlier the 
subject of a search warrant in which drugs and cash 
were seized from her residence in excess of six 
grams of methamphetamine and approximately $600 in 
cash, some of which the defendant has testified 
constituted drug money and some of which constituted 
public assistance money. 
On the 20th of January, 1996, this 
defendant was a graduate of Michigan State 
University with a bachelor's degree -- bachelor's of 
VAN FLEET COURT REPORTING,INC. (801) 652-9971 
P.O. Box 2702, St. George, Utah 84771-2702 
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1 science degree in business and a very substantial 
2 experience in the economic world in earning money 
3 and running businesses. 
4 On this date, the 20th of January, 1996, 
5 this defendant did not own a motor vehicle. Prior 
6 to that time she had been able to borrow cars from 
7 friends. She had depended on the agent, informant 
8 Ms. Williams/Hoskey for some rides for herself and 
9 her children. 
10 I On that date she was in the process of 
11 purchasing a car from one Ms. Leonard and Ms. 
12 Leonard's mother, this same Ms. Leonard being a 
13 person with whom this defendant had familiarity in 
14 the drug culture. 
15 Following her arrest on the 5th of January 
16 of 1996, this defendant had received financial 
17 assistance from her family, not her estranged 
18 husband, in order to obtain counsel and to make 
19 bail. 
20 On the 20th of July -- January of 1996, 
21 this defendant had previously been made aware of, 
22 appeared on an additional controlled substance 
23 charge on the 17th of January of 1996. The Court 
24 can only presume, and because of the motion to 
25 dismiss and the present posture, the Court must 
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presume that the State's informant, Ms. 
Williams/Hoskey was aware of all of these facts and 
circumstances in the life of this defendant. 
The less tangible findings of the Court, 
the ones which the Court takes into account, and, I 
think, must regarding the interactions between the 
agent and this defendant, Ms. Berlin, were that the 
two had shared conversations on intimate and 
personal subjects regarding difficulties in each of 
their lives on many occasions prior to the 20th of 
January of 1996. 
The Court has had the opportunity to 
observe the defendant in court testifying and Ms. 
Williams/Hoskey in court testifying. This defendant 
is more articulate than Ms. Hoskey. This defendant 
has a better presence than Ms. Hoskey in court. 
This defendant has a better command of times, dates, 
places than Ms. Hoskey in court. And the Court, in 
making this observation, finds that this defendant 
shows the appearance of being more personally secure 
in her capabilities, her intellect, her talents and 
her self sufficiency and reliance. 
On the 20th of January of 1996# this 
defendant had received a notice of eviction from her 
home that she had lived in since prior to 
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Thanksgiving of 1995, a period of time, at the time 
she was evicted, not much more than six or seven 
weeks. That also was known by Ms. Hoskey. 
The Court further finds, based upon the 
inferences that I must draw, that on the 20th of 
January of 1996 five telephone calls were made by 
Ms. Williams/Hoskey to this defendant. The purchase 
of methamphetamine and a transaction to exchange 
money for methamphetamine was discussed in at least 
the last four phone calls. Of that I am absolutely 
certain. 
The first phone call was not so 
drug-related, but the Court further finds that the 
discussion of the drugs, as related by this 
defendant, who is, on this issue, the more credible 
of the two witnesses, was not based upon specific 
need of this agent. 
The agent did not claim desperate illness, 
make appeals based on sympathy or pity or close 
personal friendship on the basis of the need of the 
informant, rather, if there was an appeal made, it 
was on the basis of the informant offering an 
economic inducement towards the needs of this 
defendant and based upon this defendant's vulnerable 
circumstance. 
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The Court specifically finds that the 
offer to purchase drugs made by the agent to this 
defendant was extended as a means of assisting and 
aiding this defendant in a circumstance of financial 
need. 
The Court specifically finds that in the 
initial conversations, the first, second, or third, 
and I think it was the second, the record will bear 
out which one because I am depending strictly upon 
the testimony of Ms. Berlin, that the quantity of 
the sale proposed was $400 for four grams of 
methamphetamine. That would have realized a profit 
to this defendant of $200. Parties discussed the 
sale would be retail meaning specifically the $400 
price for four grams. 
While this defendant had on earlier 
occasions indicated to Ms. Williams Hoskey that she 
was no longer in the business, certainly not in the 
business following the arrest and search warrant of 
January the 5th, in subsequent conversations after 
the first mention of $400 for four grams, this 
defendant apparently agreed for a lesser inducement 
of $200 for two grams to consummate the 
transaction. 
The Court focuses interestingly enough 
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upon that fact because it is unique in that the 
level of inducement, the level of economic benefit 
to this defendant and the intensity of this 
defendant's need appeared to have no relationship to 
the decision to engage in the transaction. As the 
volume of the sale went down and the profit to the 
defendant went down, it was still agreed that the 
sale would take place. 
The Court further finds that on the 
evening hours of January 20th of 1996 the sale, in 
fact, did take place in the parking lot of the Lin's 
supermarket in western St. George, and that at that 
time and place, as related by this defendant, this 
defendant removed two packages of methamphetamine 
from her brassiere, threw them on to the back seat 
of the vehicle in which she was riding, that she was 
buying from Ms. Leonard and her mother, and that the 
agent placed the $200 purchase price in a grocery 
sack on the floor of the back seat which had been 
placed there by the defendant. The agent then 
retrieved the two baggies and eventually turned them 
over to the police officers under the conditions of 
the controlled sale. 
These findings made by the Court, as I've 
indicated, are placed in the best light possible 
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inferring all of the possible inferences in favor of 
the defendant's case. Based upon those factual 
findings, my analysis of the case law in the state 
of Utah, though, again, pointing out that no case 
has been submitted to the Court wherein the Utah 
appellate courts, either the court of appeals or the 
supreme court, have looked at the defendant's 
specific economic vulnerability, as this defendant 
has demonstrated in this matter, but looking at all 
of the other factors, the Court finds that the 
motion to dismiss based upon entrapment should be 
overruled and denied. Of course that makes it 
possible to bring this issue before the jury, and I 
anticipate counsel will do so. 
Now, based upon my findings of fact, 
analysis of the law, conclusions of the law, Mr. 
Farraway, do you see any need to further amplify or 
examine any other factors in this analysis or 
finding? 
MR. FARRAWAY: No, Your Honor. I think 
the Court has adequately looked at all the facts in 
this case and has basically explained the details 
that have been before the Court today. 
THE COURT: Mr. Pendleton, let me inquire 
of you, are there specific findings of fact or 
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1 matters which you feel the Court should address in 
2 order to perfect your record? My analysis, I hope, 
3 has been clear enough so that if we get any law on 
4 this case, of course maybe a jury will make this be 
5 no law at all, but is there anything that you think 
6 the Court needs to consider? 
7 MR. PENDLETON: Your Honor, this -- from 
8 this aspect, and I'm very troubled, the Court has 
9 looked at one aspect --it seems to me like 
10 everything could go either way until we get down to 
11 discussing whether or not by the time the amount of 
12 this transaction which has been apparently a hundred 
13 dollars, whether or not this should be a inducement 
14 sufficient that it would cause someone who was not 
15 otherwise ready to engage in this kind of conduct to 
16 go ahead and engage in it. 
17 The Court, first of all, apparently 
18 assigns no significance to the fact that Ms. Berlin 
19 was apparently induced on a higher level and then 
20 after there was some contacts or something made then 
21 and then the level of the inducement is drawn back 
22 and that the -- the fact -- I don't know how the 
23 Court factors the significance of $100 for somebody 
24 who doesn't have any money, and I'm concerned about 
25 that. 
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And the biggest concern I have, Your 
Honor, is that we have looked -- now we have looked 
only at one thing. We have looked only at the 
nature of the inducement really. We haven't looked 
at the fact of the repeated solicitation. We 
haven't factored that in. We haven't factored in 
this specter of, okay, well, I'm out of business, 
and so -- okay, well, I'm going to call your sister 
and all of these things --
THE COURT: Oh, counsel, you're correct. 
Let me make a finding right now to correct that. 
The Court does specifically find that in the five 
conversations, not the last conversation, which we 
have a tape recording of and we know the exact text 
of that conversation, but in the four prior 
conversations, there was mention of the approach or 
the possible approach to the defendant's sister 
whose name is Honey Green. 
That I specifically find that occurred, 
that that was present. I probably am bound to do so 
by the level of analysis the Court must do on motion 
to dismiss after close of the defendant's case, but 
I am also convinced that such conversation 
occurred. Again, I find Ms. Berlin's testimony much 
more clear and convincing on that issue. So I'll 
VAN FLEET COURT REPORTING,INC. (801) 652-9971 
P.O. Box 2702, St. George, Utah 84771-2702 
a? 
189 
961500846 VOL. II 11-8-96 
make that finding as well. 
MR. PENDLETON: And, Your Honor, it 
appears to me that the nature of the solicitation, 
in other words, the -- somehow the Court has tried 
to balance, as a matter of fact, the nature of the 
solicitation being the economic gain. 
We -- I guess we have assumed that the 
economic gain is going to be now $100 when I don't 
know that there's even evidence to that effect, that 
it is significant to be less. That's an assumption 
I guess we have made. I don't know what the -- what 
the gain would have been. I don't know how much 
money Heather Berlin had on that date to function 
with, and I don't --
THE COURT: Nor does the Court, counsel. 
I don't have any evidence on that. 
MR. PENDLETON: That's true. But other 
than the fact that we do have evidence that -- with 
apparently no -- well, I won't belabor that. But 
the nature of the inducement seems to me to be the 
only thing that we've really considered because we 
--we take out of this formula the way -- the way I 
see it the fact that this CI repeatedly called in a 
period of one day. 
Now, maybe there isn't an expression of 
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desperation, but it would seem to me that the Court 
having made a finding that this person calls five 
times within one day, whether or not there's an 
expressed --an expression of a need or desperation 
or petition appealing to friendship it's at least 
implied, 
I think that all has to be factored in, 
and I don't suggest that that's the need --
(inaudible) -- but then also another thing that has 
to be factored in is the fact that --if you take 
the Cripps case, one factor there the CI or 
undercover agent apparently, though it was disputed, 
offers some fellow that he has known for very few 
minutes or tells him he would be able to get him a 
job and this fellow is unemployed and yet that in 
and of itself apparently would have been sufficient 
to send it to the jury. And I guess that 
implication would have been that a jury of 
reasonable -- (inaudible) -- could have — could 
have found entrapment. 
But see we've taken all of those things 
out of the formula because even though there is 
nothing stated by this person saying if you don't 
play ball with me, I'm -- I'm not going to have 
Carrie find that house for you. There's nothing 
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1 implied or stated that if you don't do this, you 
2 know, I won't do that. 
3 THE COURT: Counsel, let me give you 
4 another finding of fact that you just mentioned. 
5 The factual findings should also include that in the 
6 relationship between the State's informant and the 
7 defendant, the informant offered assistance from a 
8 person not known to the defendant, and Ms. Berlin 
9 testified clearly that the name Carrie had not been 
10 mentioned to her, but did, in fact, offer assistance 
11 through some source to seek additional housing for 
12 this defendant since she was going to be evicted. 
13 That factual finding needs also be put in there 
14 because it is part of the milieu from which this 
15 setting arose, and it is part of the facts that I 
16 considered as well. 
17 Counsel, my concern, and I'll put it on 
18 the record now, and if I am error --in error, then 
19 the court of appeals can tell me, but in all of the 
20 cases, the Utah cases that we have used, from Taylor 
21 forward, they have all gone back to the statute 
22 which specifically states, Officers induce the 
23 commission of an offense in order to obtain evidence 
24 by methods creating a substantial risk that the 
25 offense would be committed by one not otherwise 
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ready to commit it, and it is the methods used and 
the risk created that the Court is focusing on. 
And as you have indicated, counsel, it's 
difficult to separate that sometimes, in this case, 
from the vulnerability and the needs expressed by 
this defendant, but I do find as an irrefutable 
problem in this analysis from the defense standpoint 
that as the economic inducement for a person of this 
vulnerability reduced the decision to go ahead and 
engage in the conduct and create the evidence that 
constituted the offense still continued and is 
brought to fruition. 
And I -- I -- I agree with you, Mr. 
Pendleton. I ended up pivoting on that one issue, 
but I'm not sure that I know any other way to do 
it. If the courts of appeal of this state want to 
give me a different formula using different 
procedures and different methods, I invite them to 
do so. This may be a good case in which to do it, 
but I'm not sure that I can take any other 
conclusions from that, what appears to be me to be a 
pivotal fact. 
That still doesn't mean you can't bring it 
before a jury, and, of course, you can, and they 
will listen to you all hopefully in a more efficient 
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fashion, but if not, we'll take the time it takes. 
At this time I must address this other 
item, counsel. Mr. Pendleton, you were involved as 
one of the counsel for the litigants in Westerguard 
versus Martin which is set on November 18th and 19th 
of this month. I would like to place Ms. Berlin's 
case, this case on for trial on those two dates. I 
have four days available in which we could try it 
beginning Monday, Tuesday and then we could go 
Thursday, Friday if needed. Mr. Farraway, let me 
inquire of you, do you have any irredeemable 
conflicts on those dates? 
MR. FARRAWAY: I don't have a calendar 
before me at this time, Your Honor, so I don't know 
that. I do have some cases coming up. You know, 
obviously, I've been here for the last three days 
with you on Edwin Stokes and now this so I -- I 
don't know where I stand, whether there's any 
conflicts with any other courts. 
THE COURT: Well, I'll, of course, see 
that you're cleared out because as we all know Ms. 
Berlin has been in jail since the 16th of August and 
this needs to come to trial. All right, counsel, 
let's --
MR. PENDLETON: Your Honor, I would appeal 
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1 to the Court to consider reduction of bail in this 
2 case. 
3 THE COURT: Frankly, counsel, I am not 
4 persuaded. Tragic as it is for a person of this 
5 abilities to be sitting in jail, under the facts and 
6 her circumstance, I see no other approach. 
7 MR. PENDLETON: Your Honor, I just want to 
8 express something that should be predetermined from 
9 the arguments advanced by the State in this case. 
10 This is going to be a very dangerous case to try to 
11 -- try to a jury even -- (inaudible) --
12 understand what the public policy issues are. 
13 THE COURT: I frankly think not, counsel. 
14 By the time it gets down to drafting an instruction 
15 on what entrapment means, I think there's adequate 
16 guidance in the law. 
17 MR. PENDLETON: The Court, as I understand 
18 it, has ruled that we have not even presented enough 
19 evidence to require the State to put on a case. 
20 THE COURT: That's correct, counsel. That 
21 does not mean that you cannot preserve and have not 
22 preserved your entrapment defense for the jury. 
23 MR. PENDLETON: I realize that. 
24 THE COURT: Think it over, counsel. It's 
25 awfully late in the day on a Friday afternoon, and I 
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think everybody is fatigued on the matter. We're in 
recess. 
(Thereupon, the hearing 
was concluded.) 
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